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t  is,  perhaps,  understandable  to  initially  nomics  of all  nations. The world's cardi- 
view  pressures  or  problems  confronting  nal  objective appears to be shifting from 
society  from  a  rather  narrow  perspective  in  growth to survival.' 
.  . 
terms  of  space  and  time.  Thus,  concern  is 
manifested  first at the individual  level,  mov- 
ing on to higher levels such  as the family and 
community, until  ultimately  the concern  may 
become  global.  Similarly,  in  terms  of  time, 
concern  over  the future  typically  is  subordi- 
nated  to concern  over  the  present.  Thus,  it 
is  noteworthy  that  throughout  much  of  the 
world,  one  can  perceive  a  growing  sense  of 
concern about the future and what it portends 
for the world community. In particular, there 
appears to be  an increasing  skepticism about 
the future and  the inevitability  of  worldwide 
material  progress. This shift  in  attitude from 
an  almost  ritualistic optimism  on  the part of 
the  more  well-off  countries  signifies  an ero- 
sion  in  confidence in  our ability  to shape the 
future.  Leonard  Silk,  a  contemporary  com- 
mentator  on  the  economic  scene,  has  ob- 
served: 
The soaring  prices  of  oil  and  other 
world commodities, the shortage of food, 
the  heightened  tension  between  the  de- 
veloped  and  developing  countries,  the 
new  disease of  stagflation-are  all  these 
manifestations  of  a  transient  crisis  or 
something  far  deeper  and  more  endur- 
ing:  the approaching end  of  the  world's 
explosive  population  and  economic 
growth? 
That  is  emerging  as  the  basic  issue 
beneath  the day-to-day  politics and eco- 
It is undoubtedly difficult to make such  a 
sweeping assessment  and have it apply equal- 
ly  to all of the nations. Certainly, those mem- 
ber  states  of  the Organization  of  Petroleum 
Exporting  Countries  view  the  future  with  a 
decidedly  different  perspective  than  do  the 
very  poor  and  energy-deficient  developing 
countries  of  the Third  World.  Similarly, al- 
though future growth  prospects among the in- 
dustrialized countries are not expected to mir- 
ror the  achievements of  much  of the postwar 
period, it is probably not true that these same 
nations  have come to question  their  very ca- 
pacity  to survive.  Nonetheless,  the  high  de- 
gree of  complacency  about  the future exhib- 
ited  by  so  many  clearly  has  been  jolted  by 
those events  to which  Leonard  Silk  has  al- 
luded. 
To be  sure,  the notion  of  some ultimate 
limit to economic growth should not be viewed 
as  wholly  startling in  an  environment  of  fi- 
nite  resources  and  infinite  wants.  However, 
with  publication of The Limits To Growth in 
1972-a  product of the Club of  Rome's  Proj- 
ect  on  the Predicament  of  Mankind-the is- 
sue of  the sustainability of  growth  moved  to 
the foreground  of  public  debate  and  discus- 
sion.  That  study,  which  utilized  a  computer 
I/Leonard  Silk. "From Growth to Survival,"  New York Times. 
November 19, 1974, p. c43. 
Monthly Review  0 February 1975  3 On Economic Growth 
model  of  the  world,  generated  the following 
as one of its conclusions: 
If  the present  growth  trends in  world 
population,  industrialization,  pollution, 
food  production,  and  resource  depletion 
continue  unchanged, the limits to growth 
on  this  planet  will  be  reached sometime 
within  the  next  one  hundred  years.  The 
most  probable  result  will  be  a  rather 
sudden  and  uncontrollable  decline  in 
both population and industrial capacity .' 
This apocalyptic vision of  the future contrib- 
uted  to an  expanded  debate about economic 
growth-a  debate  which  continues.  Although 
much  of  the  discussion  has  been  addressed 
to  the  matter  of  whether  continued  eco- 
nomic growth is possible, an increased aware- 
ness  of  certain  disamenities  which  often  ac- 
company  growth  has  prompted  concern  over 
the  necessity  or desirability  of  growth  itself. 
These matters will  be explored  in  the follow- 
ing analysis. 
IS GWOWTW POSSIBLE? 
An  important prerequisite to assessing the 
rather  grim  conclusion  of  The  Limirs  To 
Growth  is  to  understand  the  nature  of  ex- 
ponential  growth.  Exponential  growth  is 
characterized  by  increases  which  are a  con- 
stant  percentage  of  the  whole  in  a  constant 
time  period. Compound  interest  is  a  readily 
familiar  illustration  of  exponential  growth. 
If  a  sum  of  money,'for example  $1,000,  is 
invested  at 7  per  cent  per  annum compound 
interest,  at  the end  of  the  first  year  it  will 
cumulate to $1,070. Since the interest  for the 
second  year  is  a  percentage of  the accumu- 
lated  amount,  the 7  per  cent  return  for  the 
second year will exceed that of the first. And 
in  each  succeeding  year,  that  same  7  per 
cent rate of return will add successively larger 
dollar amounts to the total, so that in approxi- 
mately  10  years,  the original sum  of  $1,000 
will  have  grown  to  $2,000,  or  twice  the 
initial  investment.  At  simple  interest,  or 
2/D. H. Meadows, et. al., The Limits To Growth (New York: 
Universe Books, 1972), p. 23. 
growing linearly,  the same 7 per cent  annual 
rate  of  return  would  require  more  than  14 
years to double the original sum. 
Thus,  one  of  the  more  interesting  and 
significant attributes of exponential growth as 
compared  with  linear  growth  is  the  relative 
quickness  with  which  large sums  are  gener- 
ated.'  In fact, the concept of "doubling time" 
-the  time  it  takes  a  growing  quantity  to 
double  in  size-is  frequently  alluded  to  in 
discussions of  exponential  growth. In  this re- 
gard, it is useful to remember a simple mathe- 
matical  relationship;  the  doubling  time  for 
any entity  is  roughly  equal  to 70  divided  by 
the growth  rate. For example, if  the rate of 
growth  in  world  population  is assumed to be 
roughly constant at 2 to 2'/2,per cent per year, 
then within 30 to 35 years the world population 
will double. This is a sobering prospect in light 
of widespread  famine and  privation  affecting 
many of the world's present inhabitants. 
It should be clear that exponential growth, 
if  unchecked,  has  an  explosive  quality. It is 
this quality, particularly as it  relates to popu- 
lation and industrial growth, which colors the 
conclusion  of  the Club of  Rome study.  The 
example  of  compound  interest  growth  in- 
volves  a  simple  and  readily  predictable sys- 
tem.  In  a  complex  system  such  as  that  in- 
herent in  a  world  model  with  many  different 
quantities  that  are  interrelated,  highly  dy- 
namic,  and  growing  at  different  rates,  pre- 
dicting  the  behavior  of  the system  is  much 
more difficult. Indeed, it is most important to 
recognize the inherent limitations of  the mod- 
el  itself.  For the major purpose in  construct- 
3/In  The  Limits  To Growth, that  point is well  illustrated by  ref- 
erence  to  an  ancient  Persian  legend  about  a  clever  courtier 
who  gave his  king  a  beautiful  chessboard. He asked,  in  return, 
that  the  king  give  him  I  grain  of rice  for  the  first  square,  2 
grains for  the second, 4 grains for  the third square, and so forth. 
In  other  words,  the  amount  of rice would  be doubled  with  each 
square right up to the 64th square on  the board. The king agreed 
to  the  request  and  ordered  rice  to be  brought  from  his  stores. 
The  fourth  square  required 8  grains; the tenth  took  512  grains; 
the fifteenth took  16,384; the twenty-first  square took more than 
I  million  grains  of rice.  By  the  fortieth  square,  more  than  I 
lrillion  grains  of rice had  to  be given  the courtier. Long  before 
the  sixty-fourth  square  was  reached  the  king's  entire  supply  of 
rice was exhausted. 
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ing the world model, according to the authors 
of  The  Limits  To Growth, was  to determine 
broad  behavior  modes of  the world  system- 
or  tendencies  of  variables  within  the system 
to change  over  time. The authors stress that 
none of  the computer outputs generated is a 
"prediction,"  because  the  model  is  not  ex- 
tremely  detailed  or as precise  or comprehen- 
sive as would  be  required  to generate  mean: 
ingful  predictions.  For  example,  the  model 
considers  only  one general  population  which 
statistically  reflects  the  average  characteris- 
tics of the world population. In addition, only 
one  generalized  resource  representing  the 
combined  reserves  of  all  nonrenewable  re- 
sources is plotted on the assumption that each 
separate  resource  follows  the  general  pat- 
tern,  but  at  its own  specific  level  and  rate. 
The  purpose  and  limitations  of  such  aggre- 
gation are explained as follows: 
This high  level of aggregation  is  nec- 
essary  at  this  point  to  keep  the  model 
understandable. At the same time it  lim- 
its the information we can expect to gain 
from  the model. Questions of detail can- 
not  be  answered  because the model sim- 
ply does not yet contain much detail. Na- 
tional boundaries are not recognized.  Dis- 
tribution  inequalities  of  food,  resources, 
and capital are included implicitly  in  the 
data but they are not calculated explicitly 
nor  graphed in  the output.  World  trade 
balances,  migration  patterns,  climactic 
determinants,  and  political  processes  are 
not specifically treated.4 
In  assessing  behavior  modes  within  a 
world  system,  the authors  of  The Limits  To 
Growth conclude that exponential  growth  of 
population  and  capital, followed  by  collapse, 
is  the basic  behavior  mode  of  the world  sys- 
tem.  However,  it  is  again  necessary  to  note 
that  this  represents  a  statement  about  the 
tendencies of  certain variables to change over 
time under certain assumptions.  And  here, it 
is  important  to be aware  of  the  reservations 
which the authors themselves hold: 
4/D. H. Meadows, et. al., pp. 93-94. 
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. . . We would not expect the real world to 
behave like the world model in  any of the 
graphs  we  have shown,  especially  in  the 
collapse  modes.  The  model  contains dy- 
namic statements about only the physical 
aspects  of  man's  activities.  It  assumes 
that  social  variables-income  distribu- 
tion, attitudes about family  size,  choices 
among  goods,  services,  and  food-will 
continue  to  follow  the  same  patterns 
they  have followed  throughout the world 
in recent history . .  .5 
The shallowness of  this latter assumption was 
clearly  acknowledged  by  the  authors  in  ad- 
dressing  the  question  of  whether  the  future 
of  the world system was bound to be growth, 
followed  by  collapse  into  a  dismal, depleted 
existence.  Such  a  conclusion  would  be  war- 
ranted, they note: 
. . . Only  if  we  make the initial assump- 
tion  that our present  way  of  doing things 
will not change. 
But, they add: 
We  have  ample  evidence  of  mankind's 
ingenuity  and  social  flexibility.  There 
are, of course, many likely changes in  the 
system, some of which  are already taking 
place.h 
What  are  some  of  the  more  meaningful 
changes that are occurring to obviate the no- 
tion of world collapse? 
If  population  growth  is  assumed  to pro- 
ceed  exponentially  in  the  future,  as  in  the 
past, the inexorable pressures of such popula-  . . 
tion  growth  on  the  raw  materials  base,  the 
food  supply, and  on  the carrying capacity of 
the  environment  posit  eventual  collapse  of 
the  system.  However,  there  is  substantial 
empirical  evidence  which  demonstrates  that 
with  rising  affluence,  population  growth  de- 
clines.  For  example,  recent  data  for  the 
United  States  suggest  movement  toward  a 
stationary  population.  Evidence indicates that 
present  fertility  patterns,  if  continued,  will 
cause  the  U.S.  population  to stabilize  some- 
5/Ibid,  p. 142. 
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time  during  the  next  century.  Similarly,  in 
Eastern  Europe  including  Russia  and  the 
Ukraine,  as  well  as  in  northern  Italy,  the 
Scandinavian countries,  and Japan, the birth 
rate has come down  rapidly  during the past 
three  decades  or  so.  And,  Tinbergen  has 
noted that in some East Asian countries, birth 
rates  are  already  declining  even  though  an- 
nual per capita income is  no more than $300. 
Since  many  observers  have  thought  that 
$1,000  was  a  sort  of  per  capita  annual  in- 
come threshold  needed  to generate a  decline 
in  the birth rate, Tinbergen  is more optimistic 
regarding future population trends.' 
Similarly, technological  change or growth 
helps to forestall or negate the collapse mode 
generated by the model run. Over the last cen- 
tury  in  the  United  States,  there is  evidence 
that  output  per  unit  of  input-technology- 
has been  rising at about an average of  2  per 
cent  per  year.  Additional  information  for 
shorter  periods  of  time for  Japan and  some 
European countries also shows continued pos- 
itive  growth  in  technology.  Even  if  one  ac- 
knowledges  that technology is a  mixed  bless- 
ing,  technological  growth  and  the increased 
productivity  it  engenders  are  positive  ele- 
ments  serving  to  counter  any  eventual  col- 
lapse. 
Perhaps one of  the most obvious areas of 
existing  flexibility  and  change  involves  an 
adjustment  mechanism,  particularly  with  re- 
gard to resource depletion. For as certain  re- 
sources grow increasingly scarce, their values 
will  rise  correspondingly  and  be  reflected  in 
higher  prices.  This  may  be expected  to lead 
competing  producers to seek  substitutes that 
are  more  readily  available  and  cheaper,  or 
to  seek  better  technology  for  increasing  the 
efficient  utilization  of  resources.  In  the ab- 
sence of  such  substitutes for  the resource in 
question, the prices  of  those goods  which  re- 
quire  that  resource  will  rise  relative  to  the 
7IJan Tinbergen  in  On Growth: The Crisis of  Exploding Popula- 
tion  and Resource  Depletion,  ed. by  William  L. Oltmans  (New 
York: Capricorn Books, 1974), pp. 16-17. 
prices  of  those  goods  requiring less  or  none 
of  that  particular  raw  material,  and  con- 
sumers  may  be  expected  to shift  their  pur- 
chases away from such  goods toward less re- 
source-intensive  alternatives.  Such  effects 
can  be  brought  about  through  adjustment 
mechanisms  which  not  only  generate  adap- 
tive  rather  than  mechanistic  behavior,  but 
which  also automatically  increase productivi- 
ty.  Reduction  in  resource  requirements  per 
unit  of  Gross  National  Product  (GNP)  is 
a  phenomenon  which  has been observed  over 
time both  in  the United States as well  as in 
Western Europe. For, according to Kaysen: 
. . . It  is not in general true that the share 
of minerals  in  the national output  or the 
share of food in the national output, agri- 
cultural  production,  has  been  rising. 
Rather  it  has  been  falling  over  the  long 
period.. . . If the MIT thesis were correct, 
we  would  expect  to  see  a  rising  relative 
share of output  in  minerals and more re- 
sources  needed  to  supply  these  scarcer 
and  scarcer  minerals.  We see  the  oppo- 
site, a general decline in the share of out- 
And, work by  Nordhaus on the limitations to 
growth  posed  by  a  resource constraint  leads 
the author to state that: 
The clear  evidence  is  that  the  future 
will not be limited by sheer availability of 
important  materials; ' rather,  any  drag  on 
economic  growth  will  arise  from  in- 
creases in  costs.9 
One  need  not  agree  wholeheartedly  with 
Nordhaus'  observation to at least  appreciate 
the fact that adjustments to possible resource 
depletion  are continually being made, and, in 
the process,  the limits to growth may be sub- 
stantially extended. 
Finally,  one  must  reexamine  the  role  of 
environmental  pollution  in  the  scenario  de- 
scribed  in  The  Limits  To  Growth.  Environ- 
8/Carl  Kaysen in  On Growth: The Crisis of  Exploding Popularion 
and Resource Deplerion, p. 68. 
9/William  D. Nordhaus, "Resources as a Constraint on Growth," 
American  Economic  Review,  Papers  and  Proceeding.  Vol.  64, 
No.  2, May 1974, p. 23. 
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mental  pollution  is  viewed  as an  inescapable 
concomitant  of  industrial  or  economic 
growth.  However,  with  growth  in  pollution 
has  also  come  a  growing  concern  over  the 
environment,  and  an  increased  recognition 
that  excessive  pollution  does  not  necessarily 
have to be a by-product  of  economic growth. 
If  one  recognizes  those  factors  which  have 
allowed  pollution  to increase,  it  is not  at all 
clear  that  there is  some fixed  or immutable 
limit on the extent to which it may be reduced 
short of critical levels. 
To  a  very  significant  degree,  excessive 
pollution  occurs  because  of  the  absence  of 
any clear-cut  property  rights  to the environ- 
ment.  Because  the  environment-or  more 
specifically,  its  assimilative  capacity-is 
owned  by  all of  us in  common, this valuable 
resource  had  gone  unpriced,  and  had  been 
generally  regarded as a  free good. Thus, the 
dumping of  wastes into the environment car- 
ried no explicit  monetary costs for the pollut- 
ers and  their economic activities  were  priced 
at  less  than  full  cost.  But  growing  concern 
over environmental pollution  has initiated ac- 
tion  by  society to remedy  the problem.  Such 
devices  as direct  controls  regulating the dis- 
charge of wastes into the environment are be- 
ing  used with  growing frequency. In addition, 
there are many  examples  of  internalizing or 
including  pollution  abatement  costs  in  the 
cost  of  production.  In  these instances,  pollu- 
tion-intensive  goods  are  made  more  expen- 
sive and consumption  of  them is thereby  re- 
duced,  and  pollution-intensive  methods  of 
production are made more costly as well, pro- 
viding  incentives  to producers  to seek  meth- 
ods of pollution abatement. 
Thus, adjustment mechanisms are at work 
for  reducing  environmental  pollution.  To 
those  who  would  argue  that  the  cost  of  a 
healthy  environment  is  prohibitive,  Solow 
suggests: 
.  .  .  The  annual  cost  that  would  be 
necessary  to meet  decent pollution-abate- 
ment standards by  the end of  the century 
is  large,  but  not  staggering.  One  esti- 
mate says that in  1970 we  spent about $8.5 
billion  (in  1967  prices), or  about  1  per- 
cent of GNP,  for pollution abatement. An 
active  pollution-abatement  policy  would 
cost  perhaps $50 billion  a year  by  2000, 
which would  be  about  2  percent of  GNP 
by  then.  That  is  a  small  investment  of 
resources:  you  can  see  how  small  it  is 
when  you  consider that GNP  grows by  4 
percent or so every  year, on  the average. 
Cleaning  up air  and  water  would  entail 
a cost that would be a bit like losing one- 
half  of  one  year's  growth  between  now 
and  the year  2000.  What  stands between 
us  and  a  decent  environment  is  not  the 
curse of  industrialization, not  an  unbear- 
able  burden  of cost,  but just  the need  to 
organize ourselves consciously to do some 
simple  and  knowable  things.  Compared 
with  the  possibility  of  an  active  abate- 
ment  policy,  the  policy  of  stopping eco- 
nomic  growth  in  order  to stop pollution 
would be incredibly inefficient.1° 
Thus, as the authors themselves  suggest,  the 
inevitability  of  world  collapse as seen  in  The 
Limits  To Growth is  clearly  not  a  foregone 
conclusion  when  one  recognizes  the  model's 
limitations and some of  its more questionable 
assumptions  which  underlie  the  model  runs 
and which generate its results.'' 
OS  GROWTH NECESSARY? 
In order  to maintain an economy  reason- 
ably  close  to full  employment, given  the his- 
torical'  rate of  increase  in  labor  productivity 
and in  labor force growth, the U.S. economy 
IO/Robert  M. Solow, "Is  the end of the world at  hand?',  in  The 
Economic Growth Controvers.~,  ed. by  Weintraub. Schwartz, and 
Aronson  (New  York:  International  Arts  and  Sciences  Press, 
Inc.. 1973). p. 60. 
I  I/Recently,  the Club of Rome published a second report dealing 
with the kinds of considerations originally broached in  The Limits 
To Growth. Entitled "Mankind at the Turning Point," its authors 
are  Mihajlo  Mesarovic.  director  of Case  Western  Reserve  Uni- 
versity's  Systems  Research  Center,  in  Cleveland,  Ohio;  and 
Eduard  Pestel,  head  of  Germany's  Institute  of  Mechanics  at 
the Technical  University  of Hannover.  Unlike the earlier  highly 
aggregated  world  model,  their  model  treats  the  world  as  10 
interdependent  regions  but  with  their  own  peculiar  social,  eco- 
nomic,  and  geophysical  characteristics.  Rather  than  supporting 
a  no-growth  philosophy  as  in  the  earlier  case,  the new  model 
promotes  the  notion  of selective growth.  with  less  industrializa- 
tion  in  the  more  affluent  countries  serving  to  counterbalance 
more growth in the poorer nations. 
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must expand at a rate of between 4 and 5 per 
cent in  real terms each year. For this relation- 
ship  between  the  rate  of  economic  growth 
and  unemployment  to  change,  either  labor 
force growth  or productivity  growth  rates or 
both  would  have  to  change.  If,  as  noted 
earlier,  zero  population  growth  or  a  more 
gradual approach  to a steady-state population 
is  achieved  in  the  United  States,  the rate of 
economic  growth  necessary  to  maintain  full 
employment \would decline.  Ultimately,  with 
a stable population  and new  entrants into the 
labor  force  equaling  those  retiring  from  the 
labor  force,  economic  growth  would  only  be 
required  to  match  the rate of  gain  in  labor 
productivity.  If,  in  addition,  current  trends 
toward  increased  growth  in  the services  sec- 
tor  relative  to  the  goods-producing  sector 
continue,  given  the  generally  accepted  hy- 
pothesis of  relatively  low  productivity  growth 
in  that sector,  the long-term trend rate of  in- 
crease  in  labor  productivity  may  decline, 
thereby  reducing  further  the  rate  of  annual 
economic growth consistent  with full employ- 
ment. However, it should  be  pointed out that 
even  though  these trends  are evident,  it  will 
be some time before they can appreciably re- 
duce the rate of  economic  growth  needed  to 
sustain full employment. 
Because the pressure  for full employment 
is one of the most fundamental and persistent 
pressures throughout  the world, any econom- 
ic  policy  which  leads to unemployment tends 
to  be  politically  unacceptable.  However, 
those  who  view  growth  as  undesirable  fre- 
quently  suggest  an  alternative  route  to  full 
employment that  would  obviate the need  for 
economic growth:  spreading  employment  by 
reducing  the  number  of  man-hours  worked 
per year through the use of shorter workweeks, 
or  the  like.  With  a  large  enough  reduction 
in  the average time worked per  year, growth 
in  productivity  on  a  per  worker  year  basis 
would cease as would the growth requirement 
to sustain  full  employment.  Although  such  a 
scheme may  have superficial  appeal, it  lacks 
economic  merit  for  it  promotes  deliberate 
economic  inefficiency  in  order  to  limit  the 
growth  of  GNP  without  adversely  affecting 
employment. In a world plagued by  inflation, 
such  a  program  would  be  inimical  to  any 
long-run  solution  of  that  problem.  Further- 
more,  the world  is  characterized  by  growing 
economic  interdependency  and  diminished 
self-sufficiency,  particularly  with  respect  to 
material inputs. In  such  an  environment, na- 
tions  must  be capable of  earning  foreign  ex- 
change  in  order  to  survive.  The  present  oil 
situation  is  starkly  illustrative of  this  point. 
The  ability  to  compete  internationally  re- 
quires  increasing,  not  decreasing,  labor  pro- 
ductivity.  And, at the same time, the require- 
ments  of  domestic  full  employment  call  for 
growth  rather  than  its  impairment.  If  these 
problems  plague  the  more sophisticated  and 
rich  industrial  nations, they  are compounded 
for  the poorer, densely  populated,  less-devel- 
oped nations. For the foreseeable future then, 
economic growth will  remain a necessary pre- 
requisite for employment growth. 
In addition to employment considerations, 
economic  growth  has  an  important  bearing 
on  income  distribution.  For  it  is  clear  that 
within  our  own  society  as well  as in  others, 
substantial inequality in  the distribution of in- 
come  has  been  tolerated  largely  because  of 
the opportunities for  upward mobility afford- 
ed  by  economic growth.  Growth  has signifi- 
cantly raised  the level  of  income of  virtually 
all  classes,  including  the poorest  in  this  na- 
tion. However, a substantial  number of  poor 
remain. If, in  the future, the reduction  of this 
residual  poverty  depends  more  on  redistrib- 
utive  efforts-slicing  the  income  pie  dif- 
ferently-than  as  a  result  of  growth  per se, 
such  efforts  are  more  likely  to  take  place 
when  the total  to  be  shared-the  size of  the 
pie-is  growing  than  when  it  is  fixed.  And 
even  where  the distribution of  income proves 
to be resistant to significant change over time, 
a  given  relative  distribution  will  be  more at- 
tractive  if  the  absolute standard  of  living  at 
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the  bottom  is  being  raised  through  growth,  nomic  growth  would  seem  to be  a  vital  in- 
than  if  the absolute standard  remains low or  gredient in sustaining this process. 
is  being reduced. Thus, even  if  growth cannot 
guarantee  a  more  equitable  distribution  of 
income,  the  inequities  are  made  somewhat 
more tolerable. 
If one looks at the distribution of income 
between  the developed countries of the world 
and  the underdeveloped  nations,  the  role  of 
economic  growth  in  uplifting  them  becomes 
even  more  apparent.  Throughout  the  post- 
World War I1 period,  the United States, via 
the  Marshall  Plan,  Public  Law  480,  private 
charities,  etc.,  has  made  substantial  foreign 
aid  contributions  to  needy  nations.  As  the 
economic strength of the industrialized nations 
of  the West  was  restored,  they  also contrib- 
uted  to  foreign  aid  programs.  However, 
given  the enormous concentration  of  popula- 
tion in the poor countries of Africa, Asia, and 
Latin, America,  even  if  the level  of  foreign 
aid  were  significantly  increased,  the' level  of 
shared  income  for  the  inhabitants  of  these 
nations would  still  be  very  low.  And, until  a 
certain  minimum  level  of  well-being  can  be  - 
established  in  these  countries,  the  incentives 
to stabilize  population growth  will  not  exist, 
and  the  cycle  of  poverty  will  continue  un- 
abated. 
It is  highly  unlikely  that  future  aid  pro- 
grams  will  lead  to  any  significant  income 
redistribution  between  the  affluent  and  the 
poor  nations.  One  only  need  examine  our 
own  society  to  note  that  charity  has  never 
provided  a  durable  basis  for  a  relationship 
between  the  poor  and  those  with  greater 
means. Pure give-away programs or even tied 
give-away  programs have  become increasing- 
ly  unpopular,  and  whenever  possible  have 
been  replaced  by  efforts  to equalize  and ex- 
pand opportunities  both  in  the economic and 
political  spheres  in  order  to  bring  about  in- 
creased  participation  by  the poor. To the ex- 
tent that  this  view  is  correct, continued  eco- 
A FINAL OBSERVATION 
The limits to economic growth are capable 
of  being  extended  by  an  intelligent  adaptive 
response  by  society.  Even  though  growing 
scarcity  of  resources  and  limits  on  the as- 
similative  capacity  of  the  environment  are 
limiting factors, it should be recognized  that a 
wise  stewardship  of  this  planet  can  extend 
and  expand  our  habitation  on  it  for  many 
years to come. At the same time, it is becom- 
ing  increasingly  clear  that  the  world  has 
evolved  into  a  place  where  grinding  poverty 
and  affluence  share  the  same  stage.  Jean- 
Paul Sartre has said that, "The ultimate evil 
is man's  capacity to make abstract that which 
is concrete." In a world  made small by tech- 
nological  advances  in  transportation  and 
communications,  it  becomes  increasingly  dif- 
ficult  to make abstract the wide disparities in 
well-being which exist between  the haves and 
the  have  nots.  In  this  regard,  the  words  of 
Lester Brown seem particularly appropriate: 
In  summary,  we  may  now  have 
reached  the  point  in  the  evolution  of 
global  society,  in  the  expansion  of  eco- 
nomic  activity,  and  in  the  deteriorating 
relationship  between  man  and  the  en- 
vironment  where  we  must  give  serious 
thought to the need to at least attempt to 
satisfy the basic social  needs of all  man- 
kind.  At  first  glance  this  seems  terribly 
ambitious. It may, however, be much less 
costly  than  we  would  at first  think if  we 
utilize some of  the new technologies and 
new approaches now available.  It may be 
one of the cheapest ways of  insuring our 
own future well-being.12 
It would  be  difficult  to envisage  the realiza- 
tion  of such  a laudable goal in  a world  with- 
out growth. 
12/Lester Brown, "Rich Countries  and  Poor." Daedalus.  V. 102: 
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